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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
is an appeal a verdict finding the defendant guilty of Domestic 
Destruction a 
trial court erred in some of its rulings and that his trial counsel provided ineffective 
assistance of counsel. 
II. ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Did the trial court err in failing to give a jury instruction on self defense? 
2. Did the Trial Court err in admitting the AudioNideo recorded by Officer Rose? 
3. Did the Trial Court err in admitting the audio of the 911 call? 
3. Did the Appellant's trial counsel provide ineffective assistance of counsel? 
Ill. FACTS OF THE CASE 
The state's witness, Dena Clemons testified that on March 1, 2015, she and the 
appellant got into an argument. The two had previously lived together but at the time 
the appellant had moved out. 
The appellant had come to the witness' house to get some of his belongings. Ms 
Clemons was in her car and the appellant was on his motorcycle. They met in the alley 
behind Ms. Clemons' house and a fight ensued. Ms. Clemons testified that she was 
unclear who started the fight. Ms. Clemons further that despite not remembering who 
started the fight, she did push the appellant and he pushed back. The fighting 
continued and the two ended up in the gravel. Ms. Clemons tried to call 911 and the 
appellant tried to get the phone but her arm was longer. 
The appellant was charged with Domestic Battery and Destruction of a 
Telecommunications device. The case was then tried in front of a jury. 
At trial, the state also called the 911 dispatcher and the officer who met with Ms. 
Clemons after the event. Both conversations were recorded. Such conversations 
differed from the testimony of Ms. Clemons at the trial. Recordings of those 
conversations were also admitted at trial. 
At the jury instruction conference, trial counsel requested the Court to give a jury' 
instruction on self-defense. The trial court declined to give such an instruction. The 
jury then returned a verdict of guilty on both counts. 
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IV. LEGAL ARGUMENT 
1. The trial court erred in failing to give the requested self-defense 
instruction. 
At the jury instruction conference, trial counsel asked that the court give a jury 
instruction on self-defense. (Transcript p. 122, II. 5-8). This request was based on the 
testimony of Ms. Clemons which differed from previous statements. The Court declined 
to give the instruction. 
In refusing the instruction the Trial Court based its decision on several factors. 
First, Self-defense was not argued in opening statement (Transcript p. 122, II. 16-23). 
Secondly, the court stated that mereiy because Ms. Clemons was the first one to touch 
did not mean it was a self-defense case and thirdly, the trial court did not see it as a self 
defense case. ( Transcript p. 123, II. 11-17). The Court also Court based its opinion on 
that the defendant had not previously claimed self-defense. (Transcript p. 125, II. 25 -
p. 126 II. 6). And finally, the Court stated it found nothing to support the claim of self-
defense. (Transcript p. 161, II. 23-24). 
In reaching its opinion, the court stated that it would require not just some 
evidence to support the self-defense argument, but a reasonable view of the evidence 
was necessary to support the claim. (Transcript p. 125, line 1). This decision was 
erroneous. 
The question of whether the trial court properly instructed the jury presents a 
question of law over which this Court exercises free review. State v. Keaveny, 136 
Idaho 31, 28 P.3d 372 (2001); State v. Gleason, 123 Idaho 62, 844 P.2d 691 (1992). 
On appeal, when a party challenges a decision of the trial court denying a proposed jury 
instruction, we review the jury instructions to determine whether the instructions, taken 
as a whole, fairly and accurately reflect the issues and the applicable law. Lankford v. 
Nicholson Mfg. Co., 126 Idaho 187, 879 P.2d 1120 (1994). 
The jury must be properly instructed or the case should be remanded for a new 
trial. In instructing jurors, "the court must state to them all matters of law necessary for 
their information." I.C. § 19-2132. A defendant is entitled to have the jury instructed on 
every defense or theory of defense having any support in the evidence, State v. 
Brief of Appellant - 2 
Kodesh, 122 Idaho 756, 758, 838 P.2d 885, 887 App.1992); State v. 119 
62 1991). 
case is State v. 1 , 986 
1999) where the Appellate Court reversed a trial court that refused to give a self-
defense instruction. The Court of Appeals found that testimony of the complaining 
witness that she touched the defendant first was sufficient to require the instruction on 
self-defense. The credibility of the testimony and the resolution of any inferences of 
that testimony was up to the jury as the trier of fact and not for the court to determine. 
The Court held that the trial court erred in not instructing the jury as to self-defendant 
and the case was then remanded for a new triai. 
In this case, Ms. Clemons testified that she pushed first. In fact she testified that 
the appellant was just trying to get away. This testimony meets the criteria of "some 
evidence" and justified the self-defense jury instruction. 
Instead, the trial court became the trier of fact. Weighing the evidence and 
opining as to the value of that evidence prevented the jury making the ultimate decision. 
The court erred in failing to give the requested instruction and the jury verdict should be 
vacated and the matter remanded for a new trial. 
2. The trial court erred in admitting the 911 tape and the body cam video as 
an excited utterance. 
The State sought to introduce the body cam video of Officer Rose showing his 
interview of Ms. Clemons after he arrived to the seen. The State offered this evidence 
for the proof of the truth of the matter asserted and the Court allowed its admission an 
"excited utterance." (Transcript, P. 116, II. 13-15). 
The excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule authorizes the admission of 
hearsay if the testimony recounts "[a] statement relating to a startling event or condition 
while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or 
condition." I.R.E. 803(2). To fall within the excited utterance exception, an out-of-court 
statement must meet two requirements. First, there must be a startling event that 
renders inoperative the normal reflective thought process of the observer, and second, 
the declarant's statement must be a spontaneous reaction to that event rather than the 
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of reflective thought. State v. Parker, 112 Idaho 1, 4, P.2d 921, 924 (1986); 
Burton, 115 Idaho 11 1156, 1248, 1250 App.1989). 
Whether a statement falls within the excited exception is a 
discretionary determination to be made by the trial court, Id.; State v. Valverde, 128 
idaho 237, 239, 912 P.2d 124, 126 (Ct. App.1996), giving consideration to the totality of 
the circumstances. State v. Stover, 126 Idaho 258, 263, 881 P.2d 553, 558 (Ct 
App.1994). 
The importance of the passage of time as a factor is illustrated in Burton. In that 
case, the Court of Appeals a defendant's statement made five minutes after an 
altercation in which the defendant had fired a gun, hitting two people. The defense 
sought to introduce an exculpatory statement made by the defendant to his son as they 
were driving away from the site of the shooting. The Court held that the trial court had 
properly refused admission of the statement as an excited utterance because the 
remark "was removed by time and distance from the events." To be noted that the 
rationale underlying the excited utterance exception is the "special reliability which is 
regarded as furnished by the excitement suspending the declarant's powers of 
reflection and fabrication." Id. at 1156, 772 P.2d at 1250 (quoting E. CLEARY, 
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE§ 297 [986 P.2d 349] 133 Idaho 326 at 855 (3d 
ed.1984). 
The Court of Appeals concluded that because of the lapse of time between the 
startling event and the statement, as well as the self-serving content of the statement, 
the circumstances did not point to "special reliability" that would render the remark 
admissible under the excited utterance exception. 
Similar considerations need to be made in this case as there is a several minute 
lapse, probably about 5 minutes, between the startling event and the conversation with 
the officer. The appellant had left. She called 911, officers were dispatched and it 
took time for them to arrive. This is a significant period of time which removes Ms. 
Clemons from the event. This gives an adult time to reflect and fabricate a story. Or 
allow anger to influence what is said. What is said is not longer an excited utterance. 
This is a similar set of facts to the Hansen case where the Court of Appeals ruled 
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that statements made by the victim did not qualify as excited utterances. 
prevented from application a broad view of the excited 
exception the victim's statements. 1 Idaho at 986 
Ms. Clemons testified that by the time the officer arrived she was angry and mad 
No ionger under the influence of the event she was not clear as to what happened. Her 
statements to both 911 and to the officer should not have been admitted as an excited 
utterances. 
3. The Trial Court erred in admitting the audio recording of the 911 call. 
The State also sought to introduce a copy of the audio of the 911 call, made 
shortly after the event. The Court aliowed its admittance as an excited utterance 
(Transcript, P. 115, line 25 thru P. 116, IL 1-3) and as a present sense impression 
(Trancript, P. 115, 1113-16). However, the 911 call includes much more information 
than covered by this exception. 
As with the audio/video recorded by Officer Rose, the 911 call was made after 
the event occurred. For the reasons stated above, the Trial Court erred in admitting the 
audio of the 911 as an excited utterance. 
Further, the trial court erred in admitting the audio as a present sense 
impression. Idaho Rule of Evidence 803(3) states "Then existing mental, emotional, or 
physical condition. A statement of the declarant's then existing state of mind, emotion, 
sensation, or physical condition (such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, 
pain, and bodily health), but not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the 
fact remembered or believed unless it relates to the execution, revocation, 
identification, or terms of declarant's will." 
Here, the 911 audio contained more than the declarant's state of mind. It was 
introduced, not only as impeachment evidence, but for the truth of the matter asserted, 
as it contradicted the complaining victim's testimony. Such testimony involved the facts 
surrounding the incident and the identity of the alleged assailant are contained in these 
calls, far more than just a present sense impression. This was erroneous and the jury 
verdict must be vacated. 
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4. Trial counsel's performance was ineffective. 
criminal defendant is entitled the effective assistance Strickland 
Washington, 466 U . 668, 104 S 80 a 
deficiency, the applicant has the burden of showing that the attorney's representation 
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 
760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988). To establish prejudice, the applicant must show a 
reasonable probability that, but for the attorney's deficient performance, the outcome of 
the trial would have been different. Id. at 761, 760 P .2d at 1177. 
A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is an issue rarely appropriate on 
direct appeal from a judgment of conviction; rather it is usually reserved for 
post-conviction relief proceedings, where a more complete evidentiary record can be 
developed. State v. Osborne, 130 Idaho 365, 372, 941 P.2d 337, 344 (Ct. App.1997). 
However, in the case of a misdemeanor, it makes sense as there is no time for the filing 
of a petition for post conviction relief. 
In this case, trial counsel's representation was deficient for the following reasons: 
(1) Failing to obtain color copies of the photographs used as exhibits prior to trial and 
(2) counsel's conduct in closing arguments. 
While inexperience alone is not sufficient to show ineffective assistance, State v. 
Hairston, 133 Idaho 496, 988 P.2d 1170 (1999), the inexperience shown by trial 
counsel did impact the appellant's trial. 
From the start of the trial to the finish, it appears that trial counsel was not 
prepared for the trial. Not obtaining color photographs of potential trial exhibits and not 
inquiring as to whether better copies of the 911 call existed would most likely have 
affected the preparation for the trial. 
And finally, counsel showed his inexperience during closing argument. Counsel 
ended his brief closing argument with "We say these things in the name of Jesus --
sorry. Different talk -- time. " Showing his confusion that he was in a trial, not in church. 
An embarrassing and distressful statement. Such conduct could have no other effect 
than to influence a jury negatively for the appellant. 
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CONCLUSION 
reasons stated the appellant asks 
/l ' a:;2t~ 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this" day of July, 2016. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this~ i of July, 2016, I served a true and correct 
copy of the within and foregoing document upon the attorney(s) named below in the 
manner noted below: 
David Shiriey 
Burley City Attorney 
P.O. Box 910 
Burley, ID 83318 
X By depositing copies of the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, at 
the post office in Rupert, Idaho. 
__ By hand delivering copies of the same to the office of the attorneys(s) at his 
office in the address stated above. 
__ By telecopying copies of the same to said attorney(s) at the telecopied 
number(s) , and by then mailing copies of the same in the United 
States Mail, postage prepaid, at the post office in Rupert, Idaho. 
Brief of Appellant - 7 
